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PROFESSOR TROY A. MCKENZIE: Good morning, everyone.
I’d like us to reconvene with our second panel. As you can see,
we have a full group up here, so I want to jump right in.
Before I do that, I want to set the scene a little for what our
panel is going to be talking about.
Our panel is following obviously the first panel, which—as
Sam and the other participants noted—focused on the current
state of the class action with a particular focus on the con-
sumer class action, and many of the doctrinal and practical
limitations that have arisen with respect to the use of the class
action device.
This panel is going to follow on that theme, but think
about some of the potential routes within the class action de-
vice itself: of perhaps overcoming some of those limitations,
and perhaps improving the use of the consumer class action,
and perhaps improving both its ability to be used in the first
instance and its legitimacy when used as a procedural device.
In a way our principal commentators are going to start
and are going to look at bookends of the process, the front
end and the back end. So, our first speaker will be Beth Burch,
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who is at the University of Georgia School of Law, and is one
of the most promising young scholars in the field of complex
litigation. She is going to be discussing issue classes.
Then, we are going to move to Brian Fitzpatrick, who is at
Vanderbilt Law School. And I would call Brian a junior
scholar, but unfortunately—
PROFESSOR BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK: I just look young.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Yes, well unfortunately we’re con-
temporaries, and so I would love to call him a junior scholar,
but knowing myself, I know I’m now old so I can’t do that
anymore.
And Brian is going to talk about the back end, about vari-
ous methods to think through the compensatory piece.
Do consumer class actions actually get money to claimants?
Do they actually seek out money that is provided for them?
And then we are going to have commentary from
Elizabeth Cabraser, who really needs no introduction—one of
the leading plaintiff-side lawyers—and who is also a member of
the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
And also Orran Brown, who is at a law firm, BrownGreer that
is a preeminent firm in the field of claims administration.
And so without any further ado, I would like to turn it
over to Beth Burch.
PROFESSOR ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH: Thank you,
Troy. I suspect that many of you—who saw that we are going to
be talking about issue classes today—would have expected me
to talk a little bit about whether they should exist, and then, if
they should exist, how it fits within predominance. But I actu-
ally want to start at a very different point. I want us to talk a
little bit about what I see as the misguided search for class
unity.
This class cohesion seems harder and harder to come by
the more you have nationwide conduct by a defendant, but
you have these sort of traditional jurisdictional boundaries
with states, and traditional state laws. I’ve spent many years
now thinking about class cohesion and what really qualifies a
group to litigate as a single unit, and I think I’ve discovered
that I may have been on, what we call down South, a “snipe
hunt” that has lasted about a decade.
Let me tell you why I think that is, and give you a little bit
of history of what class cohesion is about and what it isn’t
about, and how that in turn relates to issue classes. The term
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“class cohesion” actually got thrown around in the 1966 Rules
Advisory Committee discussion. Reporter Ben Kaplan sugges-
ted that notice and opt-out rights in Rule 23(b)(3) could actu-
ally solve for problems of weak intra-class unity.
But you will notice, if you read the Rule, that the term
“cohesion” appears nowhere within Rule 23 itself. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has imported these cohesion con-
cerns in no less than three parts of the Rule. In Amchem, the
Supreme Court says, well, cohesion is inherently part of the
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). One year later,
they decide Ortiz. Then they say, well, actually cohesion is en-
sconced within Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which of course has no bear-
ing on predominance whatsoever, and doesn’t actually have a
predominance requirement because it’s all about limited
funds. More recently, we saw in Wal-Mart v. Dukes that perhaps
cohesion is ensconced within Rule 23(a)’s commonality. We
have this commonality component that requires some glue
holding employment discrimination decisions together.
Despite having located this cohesion concern, in no less
than three parts of Rule 23, the Supreme Court has never
once told us what class cohesion means. They have never told
us what counts for class unity. And they’ve never once told us
how much unity is required.
Now, not surprisingly, lower courts tend to invoke class
cohesion kind of haphazardly. They come up with a smatter-
ing of metrics to try to measure it. They say, well, it’s really
about race and gender. We saw Myriam, just in the last panel,
talking about these prototypical examples of (b)(2) for civil
rights cases.
But if you even look at some of the civil rights cases, like
school desegregation and school bussing cases, if you look at
the members within this presumably cohesive class, you have
some folks who really want to improve local black schools in-
stead of integrating. You have others who want to avoid bus-
sing their kids to integrated but poor schools. Yet they are pre-
sumed to be cohesive. They’re all sort of lumped together in
this very “cohesive” group.
Same sort of principles, by the way, hold true for Title IX
cases and Title VII cases. You have members who are happy
with the status quo. You have employees who really don’t want
to litigate, and yet they are lumped together, and they are pre-
sumed to be a cohesive group.
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I want to suggest something that is both—if it can be—
radical and intuitive. I want to suggest that what bonds the
plaintiffs together for the purposes of litigation isn’t their skin,
it’s not their gender, it’s actually the defendant’s conduct to-
wards them. If courts are willing to reorient their traditional
thinking about group cohesion along these lines, then it’s go-
ing to free them to think pragmatically about how to situate,
sort, and adjudicate what’s actually common.
Let me suggest to you that if you take any claim or any
defense, you can sort it into two categories according to the
goals that those elements are meant to serve. Some elements
are meant to regulate the defendant’s conduct. Some ele-
ments are meant to determine the plaintiff’s eligibility for re-
lief.
So let me tell you a little bit what I mean by that. These
defendants’ conduct elements, things like—what the defen-
dant knew, when the defendant knew it, whether the defen-
dant used a biased hiring procedure, whether the defendant
issued consumer warranties, whether their washing machines
are smelly, and whether that’s a problem, how companies ad-
vertise, how they label their products—these are all conduct
elements. When a defendant’s actions are uniform and when
they’re governed by the same or similar laws, the conduct ele-
ments are common to all the people who are affected by that
conduct.
Now, obviously in private litigation, we have eligibility ele-
ments. This is my term, not theirs. But when private plaintiffs
sue, they have to show that they’re actually entitled to the kind
of relief that they’re requesting. Now, some of these eligibility
elements might actually be part of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.
So, specific causation, loss causation, damages, reliance, these
are all part of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Sometimes these spe-
cific eligibility elements actually come in as affirmative de-
fenses. Things like contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk, or even statutes of limitation are all measuring the plain-
tiff’s eligibility for relief even though the defendant has the
burden of proving them.
Historically, it’s the eligibility elements that tend to be the
most significant barriers to wholesale class certification. But if
we’re willing to start thinking about issue classes, issue classes
can actually allow for partial certification just to the defen-
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dant’s conduct, and efficiently resolve whether that conduct is
wrongful, and thereby avoid inconsistent judgments.
If we are willing to certify these conduct elements, then
we can think about how this fits with the ALI’s definition for
aggregate treatment. I think certifying conduct elements when
those elements are uniform would, in the words of the ALI,
“materially advance the resolution” of the claims.
Let’s look at couple of quick examples. McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch, a classic Title VII case. If you’re resolving the
question of whether allowing these teaming and account distri-
bution policies is going to disparately impact African
Americans, then that materially advances the claims of all of
the people who are affected by those policies.
But sometimes, and here’s the major caveat, sometimes
the defendant’s conduct is actually decentralized. Sometimes
it only comes into focus by looking at a series of individual
actions. When I try to explain this to my class, I sort of say what
it’s like is looking at a pointillism picture. You can’t just look at
a single individual dot and see what the whole picture looks
like. Let me suggest that issue classes on conduct elements
don’t actually advance the claims resolution when the conduct
itself is not uniform—when you have to take a step back and
look at the whole picture.
Think about two classic Eleventh Circuit cases, Rutstein v.
Avis Rent-A-Car, and Jackson v. Motel 6. In Rutstein, the plaintiffs
would have to demonstrate individual circumstances of why
they were denied car rentals in order to show any sort of relig-
ious animus on Avis’s part. Same sort of thing for Jackson v.
Motel 6, each plaintiff has to prove why they were either denied
hotel accommodations or rented dirty rooms in order to show
any sort of racial discrimination on Motel 6’s part.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have tried to mask this heterogeneity
in different ways. One of the ways that they often do this is
through statistics and experts. They try to show the judge the
whole picture all at once by using statistical evidence. But that
doesn’t magically transform a series of individual wrongs into
one common wrong. The proof is still a series of individual
wrongs: dirty room, dirty room, dirty room, didn’t get a hotel
at all. So issue classes are inappropriate in those sorts of cases.
On the other hand, if we’re actually willing to think about
these conduct elements, as I call them as what glues the class
members together, then we can replicate some of the other
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strategies that have worked well for plaintiffs. One strategy is
to change the underlying substantive law: suing under RICO
or medical monitoring forces the court to really look at the
defendant’s conduct as a whole. It brings the defendant’s con-
duct into focus as opposed to the series of individual plaintiffs’
actions.
Reorienting the elements in any sort of claim or defense
along these lines helps us not only with commonality and with
predominance, but it can also situate how courts think about
Rule 23’s other requirements as well, for example, typicality.
Typicality would test whether the defendant’s conduct to-
wards the class representative is actually typical of how that
conduct affects other class members. In this way, typicality and
commonality screen for decentralized conduct.
Adequacy, on the other hand, should actually prove far
less disruptive when courts certify conduct elements. If you
think about the most disabling conflicts, the most disabling
conflicts tend to arise from eligibility elements, things like—
reliance or loss causation, or damages, or specific causation—
these things that tend to be more individuated to the class
members.
I think that if courts are willing to shed conventional
thinking about two things, about class cohesion on the one
hand, and about the need for either wholesale class certifica-
tion or nothing on the other, then we can do a couple of
things. We can promote consistency among multiple regula-
tors, whether it’s a state attorney general through a parens
patriae case, or through a series of private individual actors. We
can promote consistency in the outcome by adjudicating the
defendant’s conduct once on the merits. This furthers substan-
tive goals. Whether you feel like compensation, or deterrence,
or some mix of the two is the right metric, this will help fur-
ther those substantive goals because we’re actually testing
cases on the merits for a change.
Finally, it affords some measure of predictability to subse-
quent preclusion questions. It’s true that a court can’t ever
predetermine the res judicata effect of its judgments, but if you
have a specific and carefully crafted issue class, it makes those
subsequent preclusion questions much more palatable and
easier to decide.
I’m obviously leaving out a host of different interrelated
doctrinal, practical, logistical, and constitutional concerns. I’m
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happy to talk about those a little bit more later, but I wanted to
leave plenty of time for the rest of our co-panelists.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Thank you, Beth. I would now like
to turn it over to Brian Fitzpatrick and his co-author whom
I neglected to introduce earlier, Bobby Gilbert of Grossman
Roth. They have a very interesting paper on claiming rates in a
class action with actual data.
PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK: Thank you, thank you Troy. I’m
here with my co-author Bobby, and this paper was really in-
spired by the Center’s request and wish for some data on what
goes on in terms of compensation in consumer class actions.
Bobby was the lead liaison counsel for an MDL in Florida
that involved a number of class actions against some of the
largest banks in the United States, and I was an expert in some
of those cases. So, Bobby has access to a great deal of data
about what happened to the settlements in those cases. We de-
cided to try to mine some of that data to be helpful to courts
and scholars about what goes on in consumer fraud class ac-
tion settlements.
Bobby’s going to talk later to describe the cases and how
we got the data, but one of the things that I want to say at the
outset is that we have access to a lot of data from these settle-
ments, and I really would like to ask you for your help in com-
ing up with some ways in which this data can be useful. In the
charts and graphs I’ll be presenting today, these were the ways
in which we thought this data might be helpful to scholars and
to practitioners and to judges. But please if you have other
ideas of what we can do with this data, or other information we
can ask the settlement administrators for about these settle-
ments, please let us know because I’m very curious to try to
maximize this opportunity that we have to really learn some-
thing about consumer class action settlements. Please, you
know, we’d love your help.
One thing I want to stress at the outset, and Bobby’s going
to cover this in more detail in a few minutes, is that these set-
tlements that we’re going to talk about, they were not kind of
the ugly poster child consumer fraud settlements—you know,
the wanted poster kind of consumer fraud settlements, where
you had to file a claim form to get paid. These were settle-
ments, which we refer to as automatic distribution settlements.
The defendant had data on the class members that allowed for
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the class members to receive payment automatically without
having to file a claim form.
At the very outset, I want to make that clear, and Bobby
will make it more clear, that this may not be representative of
consumer fraud settlements, although with technology im-
proving as it is, the era of big data is upon us. I think compa-
nies have more and more data on who their customers are. So,
these automatic distributions may become more and more
possible than they have been in the past.
I think, if it is okay, Troy, I am going to stand up.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Yes.
PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK: Is that okay? And get in front of
this screen here, so that I can actually see the PowerPoint pres-
entation as you do as well.
The data we have is about class participation in these con-
sumer fraud settlements, and as the discussion has talked
about earlier today, there’s not a lot of data out there on how
often class members participate in consumer fraud settle-
ments. So there is a very good study by Professor Eisenberg,
and the superb Professor Miller, on opt-out rates in class ac-
tion cases. They studied thirty-nine consumer fraud class ac-
tions. They found a very low opt-out rate, 0.2% in consumer
fraud cases.
Claim rates, again we’re not going to be able to add to
this literature today because our settlement was not a claims-
made settlement, but there is very little data out there on how
often class members file claims when they have to in a settle-
ment, and the ranges are quite broad. The “Ns” here are the
number of settlements examined by these studies, so there’s
not a lot of data out there.
In the first two studies, Pace-Rubenstein Study, [and] the
Hensler Study, most of those cases involved average claims
that were actually quite high. They weren’t your traditional
small-stakes consumer fraud settlements like the case that
we’re going to be describing today. The Mayer Brown Study or
as Myriam referred to it, “the memo”—that we heard about
from Andy earlier, they did study mainly consumer fraud
cases, and they found some very low claims rates in those cases.
More appropriate for what we’re going to present today
is the one piece of literature that looked at “negotiation rates,”
and “automatic settlements.” So, Pace-Rubenstein looked at
four consumer fraud-type settlements, and they looked at what
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rate did the class members negotiate the automatic payment
that they received. All but one of these actually involved very
high average allotments for the settlement, so they are not
again traditional consumer small-stakes, consumer fraud settle-
ments. But the prior literature is fairly small, as you can tell
not many studies, none of them really random and very small
numbers of settlements examined in the studies themselves.
We didn’t do a big randomized study. This is a case study
that’s based on several consumer fraud settlements. I’m going
to turn it over now to Bobby to describe the settlements and a
bit about our data.
MR. ROBERT C. GILBERT: Thank you, Brian. First of all,
I want to echo what Brian said. It’s a pleasure to be here, an
honor to be here to participate. Thank you very much for the
invitation. We hope this information will add to the scholar-
ship, and to think about what can be done in the future to
make the class action device and settlements even more effec-
tive as we move ahead.
Our laboratory, if you will, is MDL 2036. It was a case that
began in 2009, eventually included contract-based claims
brought against thirty of the largest banks in the United States.
Of those thirty banks, ten of them effectively invoked their
class action arbitration provisions in their account agreements,
and successfully extracted themselves from this MDL without
any liability whatsoever—approximately ten—leaving approxi-
mately twenty banks. Of the remaining twenty banks, all but
one of them eventually settled the claims, and as I said, one of
them is scheduled to proceed to trial sometime in the next few
months or next year.
What Brian and I did is we took seven out of the nineteen
settlements. The settlements total over $1 billion. We took
seven of the nineteen settlements that we thought could shed
some light, with the data, on information regarding opt-out
rates and negotiation rates.
So let me just describe what you see here on Table 1: the
seven banks in question with the settlement amounts of those
particular cases, what the percentage represents in the second,
what is the third column is the range of recovery as to the over-
all damages. You see quite a variation here where you see, for
example, Bank 2 is a settlement that the range of recovery was
about 9% in a case where you had a unique situation—a non-
arbitration defendant that had a nationwide release already
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entered in its favor from a prior class action, and this recovery
of $410 million was in the face of that prior nationwide release
as well as the overarching defense that all of these banks as-
serted under the National Bank Act.
The highest range of recovery is $35 million representing
63% of the actual damages in a case that was brought against a
non-arbitration defendant, where the case proceeded all the
way through class action discovery, class certification, a con-
tested class certification, a 23(f) denial, all the way up onto the
eve of expert disclosures and summary judgment motions be-
ing filed when the case settled at mediation for 63%.
You have the other cases that are listed here. The three
settlements—Banks 4, 5, and 6—that are in the mid-forty
range. Those are all non-arbitration banks that settled either
at or shortly after contested class certification was granted.
Bank 7 is an arbitration defendant, and Bank 1 is an arbitra-
tion defendant.
The distribution instrument, interesting to what we’re
looking at, is: has there been a difference in negotiation rates
where the instrument that was sent out to these class members
was a standard-sized check inside of a standard business envel-
ope versus what’s called a double postcard check? Where the
banks and securities companies have used them for some
number of years to distribute dividends, where it’s a double-
sided postcard sealed with perforated edges—the name and
address of the class member is on the outside—when they tear
off the edges and open it up, it’s a check. It’s smaller in size
than the standard-sized check, because it looks like a postcard,
hence the name postcard check. It’s less expensive to print.
It’s less expensive to mail. It saves money in that respect when
you involve millions of class members.
Also we have the allotment issue before opt-out. In all but
one of these cases, as Brian will discuss in just a moment, class
members received notice obviously through first-class mail and
publication as a supplemental notice. The final approval mo-
tions were filed before the opt-out deadline. They included
the standard language about what the range of recovery was.
But class members did not know on an individual basis what
their recovery was going to be; how much was the check going
to be that I would eventually receive in the mail if the settle-
ment was approved.
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In one case, due to a snafu involving the bank’s data that
was provided to the administrator, approximately one-third of
the class members did not receive initial notification. When
this came to the attention of all involved after final approval
had initially been granted, we had to go through a new process
of sending out first-class—literally on the eve of distribution,
we sent out to that one-third of the class—a new notice, which
they were receiving for the first time along with their checks.
We said in this notice, enclosed is your check for your al-
lotment under this particular approved settlement. Because of
this snafu in notice, you did not receive this notice earlier. If
you do wish to exercise your right to opt-out, you may do so by
signing this form and returning it together with the enclosed
check. And if you return the check, you will obviously be opt-
ing-out.
As Brian will report, we saw with this smaller group—this
one-third of the class—a much higher rate of opt-outs than we
did with the others. I should add one more thing. It’s incredi-
ble.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Yes, it is incredible.
MR. GILBERT: But the one other thing I should add before
I turn it back to Brian is this: These banks, obviously some
number of the class members were still customers of the
banks, and approximately half to 60% were no longer custom-
ers. The data we’re reporting on primarily focuses on the for-
mer customers.
Why? Because in the case of the current customers, when
the settlements were approved and distributions were made,
distributions were made automatically by account credits into
their accounts. They never had to negotiate a check. It was
automatically deposited into their accounts.
For the other half, the former customers, checks had to
be printed and mailed to those former customers. That’s the
negotiation rate data that we’re studying now, and we plan to
write on.
PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Bobby. In this Table
here, I lay out some of the basic data from the seven settle-
ments we selected, and I want to emphasize one thing. We
picked these seven settlements so there would be some varia-
tion in the circumstances of the settlements, we could test
some hypotheses about the negotiation rates, some postcard
checks, some not postcard checks, that kind of thing.
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You see the number of class members in these settlements
are very high, up to 13 million—from about half a million to
13 million class members. The average payout was quite small
ranging from $11 to $77. About one-third to one-half of the
class members got direct deposits in their accounts because
they were current customers. The other class members got the
checks automatically sent to them in the mail at their last
known address that the bank had.
When you add up the people that automatically got the
account credit and the people that cashed their checks that
were sent in the mail, you see that a very large percentage of
class members received compensation from these settlements.
The range is from 58% of all class members up to 84% of all
class members. The bottom line is, in these settlements, the
vast majority of class members are receiving compensation.
I’ll tell you I’ve long been a skeptic of the compensatory
function of consumer class actions. I think I’m with Myriam on
this. I’m a deterrence guy. I don’t really care if anyone gets
compensation. I am all about deterrence. But I will say, I was
impressed here by what happened, that we actually got money
in the hands of the vast majority of people that were injured by
these practices.
This does suggest to me, and I know Bobby certainly
agrees with this, that consumer class actions can under certain
circumstances really serve a compensatory function to class
members.
You see in this column here, the second-to-last column,
this is the rate at which the class members that received checks
in the mail chose to cash them. You see that the rate varies
quite significantly. In one of the settlements the rate was only
37% of all checks cashed, whereas in the highest case it was
70% of checks cashed. So we’re going to talk about in a mo-
ment about why we think there may have been some differ-
ence there.
One thing to note is even among the people that had to
cash checks, even when the checks were pretty small on aver-
age, still a lot of people chose to cash them. This again sug-
gests to me that maybe I’ve always been too pessimistic about
the compensatory function in the consumer fraud class action.
One thing to point out on this chart is Bank 4. Bobby
mentioned this opt-out rate difference, this snafu in the no-
tice. What you see is the opt-out rate on all other settlements is
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very small, 0.003% to 0.009%. In the Bank 4 case, the opt-out
rate is 100 times as great. We think that very well may be be-
cause in that settlement, people, a large chunk of the class
knew what their allotment was, and I suspect they probably
didn’t like it, and so they chose to opt-out.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Was it small?
PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK: The average allotment was $75.
There are a lot of them that are $5, a lot of them below $5. I’ll
talk about that in a minute. So people may have been upset.
One policy question that comes out of this is should
courts strive to tell class members what their allotments are
before the opt-out decision? Should they? We talked about it
some in the paper we’re going to write on this, but since I’m
running low on time, I’m just going to flag that question now.
Should we give people a second opt-out chance once the
checks have come in the mail, so that they can make a more
informed decision about opting-out? What good is it to give
them that opportunity? They’re not going to file a lawsuit on
their own for $75. What good is it to give that opt-out opportu-
nity? Maybe it serves the purpose of protest that the court can
take into consideration when deciding whether it’s a good set-
tlement or something of that sort.
This figure here shows what the check-cashing rate was as
a function of how big the checks were, or how much money
the checks were, the dollar denomination of the check. And
what you see obviously that when the checks get bigger, people
cash them more frequently. What really surprised me here was
even among the smallest checks, checks for under $5, the rate
at which people cashed them was pretty high.
At the lowest, it was 20%, but up to 45% of class members
cashed even the lowest denomination checks. This suggested
to us that maybe courts should not cut off the point at which
they’re willing to send a check to a class member unless it’s
just economically infeasible to send a check—for something
like $0.30 or something like that because even small checks
are cashed.
I went into this thinking that we shouldn’t worry so much
about sending checks out at all, but if we are, we ought to only
send out big checks. But even the small checks, people went
and cashed them, so that suggests to me that maybe we ought
to keep the smallest class members in the distribution.
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I’ve bolded these four banks. These are the lowest negoti-
ation rate banks. All four of those banks were the postcard
check banks. This suggested to us that class members are less
willing to cash a check that comes in the form of a double
postcard than they are traditional checks, we think probably it
is because they think maybe it’s junk mail. They don’t think
it’s a legitimate check.
Our view, and Bobby correct me if I’m wrong, is courts
probably ought to ask for a real check to be sent to class mem-
bers even if it’s more expensive unless the added cost will just
dwarf the amount in the settlement fund. If we do care about
compensation, that did seem to make a pretty big difference.
I think I’m going to stop there because I’ve gone over my
time. Thank you.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Thank you very much. I was think-
ing while Brian was speaking, how many checks have I thrown
away?
Now we’re going to turn to comments, and I’d like to start
with Elizabeth Cabraser.
MS. ELIZABETH J. CABRASER: Thank you. I was tasked with
commenting primarily on Beth’s piece, but I am so excited
about the opportunity to contribute data to this debate that
I’m going to give you two data points about the litigation that
you just learned about because I think they illuminate.
First of all, the ability of class counsel—and full disclo-
sure, I was one of the lawyers involved in the overdraft MDLs—
to negotiate a settlement that actually worked to deliver bene-
fits to consumers depended on many factors, most of which
you heard about.
But it also depended on the leverage of the attorneys to
insist upon those mechanisms. And that leverage doesn’t come
out of nowhere. It didn’t come out of nowhere in the over-
draft cases. There was a precursor to those cases.
It was an overdraft case called Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo that
was tried in the Northern District of California. At the time of
this litigation, there was a judgment. It was a bench trial on
restitution under California’s Unfair Competition Law. Same
conduct. It was a $203 million judgment.
So, the banks knew that they were at risk. Now while
this overdraft litigation was going on, Gutierrez went up to the
Ninth Circuit, was overturned on all but one claim, restitution.
The District Court was allowed by the Ninth Circuit to recon-
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sider its restitution judgment. After this settlement was negoti-
ated just last month, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the restitution
judgment. So there will be a $203 million judgment that will
be distributed to class members using these same mechanisms.
The other thing that matters in terms of enabling distri-
bution is retention of records. Records are more ephemeral
now. In Gutierrez, that case was tried in 2008. We have the
records because we went to trial, but many consumer cases
that settle, the records are long gone by the time settlement is
reached.
Now I think we will know to ask courts to order those
records be preserved at the outset because they matter not
only to class certification itself, they’re going to matter not
only to trial and these cases do go to trial, but they will matter
tremendously at the point of settlement when we want to be
able to deliver compensation to class members—there have
been some recent settlements in consumer cases where unfor-
tunately we just can’t. The case is too old. The records were
not preserved.
The other thing that I want to mention was another re-
cent case, too recent for this study but a somewhat similar case,
the Chase “Check Loan” case, also an MDL from the Northern
District of California. We just got our distribution report: $71.9
million was the net settlement amount that was distributed to
the class in the form of mailed checks. One million checks
went out, 93% of them were cashed. That’s a very high rate.
I think in part that rate is high because in that case, although
many of the checks were small, $50 or less, the practice at issue
was a practice that outraged the consumers, the bank custom-
ers. The interest rate was unilaterally raised on their check
loans in midstream, and they had two choices: pay off the
whole loan, or pay the higher interest rate when the contract
was that the interest rate would stay the same for the life of the
loan.
I think the claim that is being litigated and settled matters
quite apart from the monetary value, and that’s hard to cap-
ture with data. But I think it matters a lot, which gets me into
Beth’s thesis that when we’re looking at class definitions and
cohesion and looking at definable classes, that it is the defen-
dant’s conduct that creates and defines the class.
I think that’s true. I think it’s not only the defendant’s
conduct that creates ascertainable or definable or categoriz-
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able group of people who otherwise are unrelated. It is the
conduct that creates and defines how that group reacts to the
conduct, and how they react to opt-out opportunities, to
checks in the mail, and everything else. So it’s a qualitative as
well as a quantitative phenomenon.
The issues class, I have to say I am identified as a huge
proponent of issues classes, but I also have a fundamental con-
fusion about them because I’m not sure exactly why we need
to have a debate about 23(c)(4) in order to recognize what the
Supreme Court taught us in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
which is that when you have a question that does have or
should have the same answer no matter how many times you
ask it, that is a common question that can and perhaps should
be tried once with preclusive effect.
The problem really is that we are very, very afraid of pre-
clusion. That’s why, despite res judicata and collateral estoppel
and class actions, the number of instances of preclusive adjudi-
cation of common questions is very low. Litigators would al-
ways prefer to mitigate the risks, to have multiple bites at the
apple, and many, many, many more people are afraid of
the simple operation of preclusion than were ever afraid of
Virginia Woolf.
If you ask a regular person, not a lawyer, whether or not a
question with one answer should be answered once or a thou-
sand, or a million times, they will tell you, “Once.” You answer
the question, you live with the outcome, and you move on.
That is the power of class actions. You don’t make everybody
that has the same issue in their case litigate on their own if and
when they can because, as commentators have taught us, when
one is left alone to assert his rights—if and when he can at
best—there will be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if
indeed there is any at all.
If we think the best is random and fragmentary enforce-
ment of the law in the face of common conduct, then we
wouldn’t want preclusion issue classes or class actions of any
kind. If we think the best is some sort of coherent predictable
enforcement of the law in the face of a violation that impacts
many, then I think we’ll do the best we can to make the proce-
dures that we have available in Rule 23 work at a functional
level. If we need additional procedures or mechanisms, we will
work to develop them. And I hope as we do that we will be
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guided by the need to get past our biases and prejudices on
both sides, and be guided by the data.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Now I turn it over to Orran Brown.
MR. ORRAN BROWN: Thank you, Troy. I’m going to take us
on a whirlwind tour of the data. We’ll do it very quickly, but
I’m also honored to be here, and very grateful for this chance
to share some of this with you.
This is a quick run-through of about twenty consumer-
type cases that we have administered. We always feel like
there’s no settlement that just works. There are settlements
that are workable. Our job is to make them work on the
ground, after the parties have approved and agreed to them,
and written them up. We take the eligibility basket of issues
that Beth mentioned, that have now been transferred into
some settlement program under its own rules, and apply those
to the people who come forward.
If we want to look quickly at: are these things working? If
they’re workable, are they working? This is about twenty cases,
different types of consumer cases, so this is not just apples and
oranges. This is a basket of fruit. They’re all kinds of cases in
here: bank fees, credit card, SCRA, TPCA, statutory contrac-
tual claims.
If you look at all the money that changes hands in them,
everything all in—about 11% of it goes to administrative costs,
notice costs, and sending payments to class representatives.
About 45% of it’s going to the class members and about 44%
to the counsel. But that’s average. This is kind of an average
look. A lot of money is going to claimants; a lot of money is
going to lawyers.
This is looking at participation rates that Brian and Bobby
have talked about. We’re looking for the main driver of what
makes people come forward to join in a consumer program,
and we’ve batched them here or bucketed them by how steep
the path is to get payment. The ones that Brian mentioned
about automatic payment, we refer to it as a burden of proof,
where there’s none, where there’s an automatic payment be-
cause you know your customers. The defendant has data.
It’s not always good data, some of it’s old data, but you
can figure out where people are, or at least used to be, do an
automatic check to them or a fund deposit if you have their
fund information. Obviously, the participation rate is very
high, but not perfect—because you can’t always find every-
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body—where it’s an automatic payment. These are structural
things about a settlement that affect the participation rates
and whether the benefits are delivered to the claimants who
are in the class.
The next step is just a signed claim form. A class member
has to do some affirmative act, just sign a card and send it
back. So they have to take some action. It’s not an automatic
delivery of the benefits.
There are a lot of ways to enhance participation on how
you implement these things to make it easy for people to par-
ticipate. You send them a postcard that they just sign and send
back, with prepaid postage—a lot more will come forward, ob-
viously. That stands to reason. We get about 44–45% of people
stepping forward when all they do is send back a claim form.
If they have to send back a claim form and some informa-
tion: What was your account number? What years did you have
this? Then, they have to fill out more information. It’s tougher
for them, not all of them have it. They come back; some of
them are deficient, and you can’t pay them anyway. But we get
22%-plus playing in the program when they have to do a little
bit more. The more they have to do, the fewer people can do
it. A signed claim form and some proof—proof of purchase,
some proof of a cost, proof of paying a higher interest—the
participation rate’s going down to 15%.
Just as a benchmark, look at personal injury programs. We
do a lot of personal injury programs of all sizes. All of them
have some application process and a claim form, and some
proof you have to turn in—proof of use, proof of injury cate-
gory. We see, on average, about 73% of the known claimants
coming forward in those programs because there the money is
usually much bigger.
Superimpose on this eligibility rates. These are the same
participation rates. Let’s see how many people actually get
paid. That’s what this line is showing us. Most people get is-
sued a check. You’d have to dig deeper, like Brian and Bobby
are doing, to see how many actually cash the check. In these
consumer cases that we’ve done, about 80–85% of people cash
the check. And sometimes we can’t find them and get them
the check.
Of the people that are in these groups, what percentage
of them turn out to be eligible? It’s very high in consumer
cases. It’s not as high in a lot of the personal injury programs,
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because the burden of proof there in our process, in the settle-
ment, is higher.
Look at notice reach. Obviously, participation is a func-
tion of: do people know about the program? When you know
your customers, where you can send them automatic pay-
ments, you get very high notice reach—93%. Here, actually
the participation is higher because some of these people got
automatic loan forgiveness without us having to find them.
It looks like to us that very high notice reach is not really
the driver of participation like this burden of proof is. What
this is telling us is that what you require people to do to get the
payment is really the driver of how many people participate.
This is looking at average value of the payment—also not
a huge driver because consumer cases are all lower value.
These are average numbers you get from $20 to $1,000; look-
ing into the hundreds is kind of average. In personal injury
programs, the number is a lot higher, but again, we think that
for personal injury, the value at stake—the amount of money
you might get—is a big driver for participation.
In the consumer cases, the dollars don’t really drive as
much as the structure does. And even if we talk about overall
settlement amounts, a lot of times people hear a billion dollar
settlement. It creates a lot of news. It creates interest. You hear
that more in the personal injury area. Again, this line is show-
ing us that our participation rate is really a function of the
structure, what you have to do to participate, and not so much
what the total dollar value is.
We found, in our experience, that there are ways to en-
hance participation: by a claim form online, postcard claim
form, good website for information, a lot of claimant support
to tell people how to go about doing this, making the enve-
lopes attractive so they realize they’re official. They’re not
scams; they’re not some junk mail. You do the best you can to
make them more attractive when you send them to them.
We’ve seen that structurally, the burden of proof issue,
and then administratively, how you can grease the skids for
people to participate, are what really drive how willing people
are to join in these programs.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: Thank you, Orran. Very, very in-
formative. I’m going to exercise my moderator’s prerogative to
ask the pessimistic question because this is extremely interest-
ing. Beth’s presentation gives some hope of getting a toehold
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on how we can re-conceptualize what we’re doing in class ac-
tions so that you can look to what you can actually resolve, and
actually try to resolve it, and try to get some of the efficiencies
that should come with the device.
Brian and Bobby’s presentation suggests that we really do
have some hope of extracting out of data what makes class
members actually want to get compensation. That’s all very
hopeful, and it’s a nice sunshiny day.
Now I’m going to come with the pessimism. First, to Brian
and Bobby, what’s the universe of cases that you’re really talk-
ing about? Isn’t it true that most of the class actions out there
are going to involve some kind of claim form and then we’re
going to be down in a much lower rate? And to Beth, if issue
classes have this promise, and as you say in your paper, we’ve
dabbled in them before, why hasn’t there been a headlong
rush towards issue classes earlier?
There must be something that has held back the use of
issue classes because it just seems like such a clean and effi-
cient way of resolving the part of the case that really is com-
mon to everyone in the class. I put those notes of pessimism
out there, and discuss.
MR. GILBERT: Thanks Troy. First, before I answer your
question because I’m not as pessimistic as you on that issue,
I want to say Elizabeth pointed something out—and in her
modesty she neglected to point something out—which is that
it was her partners and her firm that secured that trial victory
in Gutierrez. In fact, they rescued the case on the eleventh hour,
and took it to trial.
Without that effort from her firm, double effort in having
to go back after the Ninth Circuit reversed it the first time, a
lot of this, as she pointed out, probably wouldn’t have hap-
pened. So it was a great deterrence factor, if you will, that
helped all of the banks that we faced in MDL 2036 realize that
we were prepared to do what they had done in front of Judge
Alsup in trying those cases so that they knew that absent the
arbitration provision and absent a post-judgment plenary re-
versal, they were going to face the music.
In answer to your question, I don’t agree. I think that the
answer is this: in contract-based cases, claim forms are typically
not needed because the data, as we’ve gotten more sophisti-
cated, exists in the computerized systems of these defendants.
But as Myriam pointed out, the problem we have there is that
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in almost all of the contract-based cases, which are like these
incredibly strong merits-based cases, we now face defendants
that have almost uniformly invoked individual arbitration.
In the tort-based cases, the non-contract-based cases,
claims are still a significant issue. I don’t consider myself an
expert who can talk about this from a data standpoint, but
logic tells me that where they are personal-injury claims or
claims based on some wrong where the amount recoverable is
sufficient to incentivize an individual to fill out a simplified
claim form, that people will do that. But that defendants and
sometimes class counsel make those claim forms too difficult.
Not intentionally, but they make them too difficult, and that
has a deterrence effect on the claim rate.
My suggestion would be in non-contract-based claims,
where we don’t have the data available, efforts should be
geared at making claim forms as simple, as efficient as possi-
ble, subject to the verification processes that people were talk-
ing about earlier.
PROFESSOR FITZPATRICK: And on that point Troy, if I could
just add something. I find it very ironic that as we try to sim-
plify the process by which people can file claims—by asking
them just to sign an oath that they were someone who bought
this product or what have you—at the same time, we see peo-
ple asking to do that, we see a defendant, BP, that is litigating
a case at the U.S. Supreme Court now where they’re arguing
that, because some people might lie on those claim forms
and might not actually be injured, that the courts don’t have
Article III jurisdiction to approve a settlement.
It’s almost heads the defendant wins, tails the plaintiffs
lose on some of this stuff. If we want people to file a claim
form, make it easy, then if someone lies on the claim form,
there’s no Article III jurisdiction. I’m not sure how we can nav-
igate all of those things, but I just wanted to point out that
there’s another side of the coin to make it easy for class mem-
bers to file claims.
PROFESSOR BURCH: I want to address Troy’s questions in
two respects. One, I think Elizabeth has talked about already
and that is, preclusion is scary. Preclusion is scary for the plain-
tiffs. It’s scary for the defendants.
Preclusion can also be a great boon for defendants. If you
look at some of the consolidated trials in Bendectin for exam-
ple, trial on general causation in Bendectin knocked out 600
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plaintiffs—same sort of thing for the smelly washing machine
cases in Ohio.
Preclusion can actually be a really great tool for defend-
ants if they feel like they have a strong case on general causa-
tion and general liability. On the other hand, there aren’t
many issue classes that are being brought because plaintiffs’
attorneys initiate them, and plaintiffs’ attorneys don’t know
how they’re going to get paid. Because we’re basing payment
to class counsel on a restitutionary theory, generally issue clas-
ses, unless they settle right after having been certified, don’t
produce a common fund.
One of the things that I’ve tried to do in my paper is tease
out how we might get some of the benefit for the plaintiffs’
attorneys to start incentivizing issue classes. So there are a
couple of analogies that I draw, and I’m happy to send these to
people who are interested. They’re a little bit nitpicky, but
I think you can draw analogies to charging liens, which have
typically been used to try to recoup costs from non-compliant
clients.
There are also analogies to the common benefit doctrine.
Common benefit is something that’s used in equitable cases
where you don’t actually create a fund, but you still confer a
benefit on class members. We see the same sort of thing, and
there are differences in terms of how you operate this in a
multi-district litigation with an issue class where the eligibility
elements are then remanded to the transferor courts, heaven
forbid, to have individual trials. That makes it a little bit more
difficult, but there are ways to deal with it then too. The law of
the case doctrine, for example, is a great way to try to get some
basic categories of compensation on the books for the plain-
tiffs. Unless there are changed circumstances then the trans-
feror judges shouldn’t meddle with the basic categories of
fees.
You can look at how much benefit the issue class attorney
generates versus how much benefit the individual attorney
generates. Does the individual attorney subsequently have to
take all of these eligibility elements to trial on specific causa-
tion? If so, then they’re going to get more of the fee perhaps
than if they settle immediately upon remand, and most of the
fee should then go to the issue class counsel.
Those are the two main barriers that I see to issue classes:
the fear of preclusion, and how do you incentivize the plain-
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tiffs’ bar to start bringing them. I don’t think that it’s impossi-
ble to overcome those two.
PROFESSOR MCKENZIE: I’d want to take questions from the
floor.
* * *
Editor’s Note: The additional Q&A session with the audience
members is not reflected in this transcript, and is available on
the NYU Journal of Law & Business website. This Conference
transcript has been edited for clarity.
